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## ABSTRACT

A message-centered dramatistic theory of communication was used in conjunction with Q-sort technique and factor analysis to build and test a message-centered foreign-policy inventory that contained three dramatic interpretations of U.S. involvement in foreign affairs: cold war, power politics, and neo-isolationism. Analysis of results from two groups of 30 subjects indicated that the power-politics drama was the most accepted rhetorical vision in Peoria, Illinois. Cold war was a close second, but it appeared to polarize Peorians. Neo-isolationism was a distant third. The results were interpreted as providing empirical verification not only for the typology of foreign-policy dramas but also for Bormann's dramatistic theory of communication. The design used in the study indicates that rhetorical messages may be tested for their persuasiveness, producing a direct relationship between message production and audience analysis without risking the credibility of a speaker. (Author/AA)

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MEDIATED RHETORIC PLAYED IN PEORIA IN CAMPAIGN '76

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FOREIGN POLICY COMMUNICATION DRAMAS: HOW  
MEDIATED RHETORIC PLAYED IN PEORIA IN CAMPAIGN '76

In 1972 Ernest G. Bormann set forth a dramatistic communication theory.<sup>1</sup> The starting point for his theory is not the speaker, the audience, the channel, nor the situation, but the message. To him, the message is dramatistic in form, filled with heroes, villains, scenarios, and scenes. Bormann argued that large groups of people get caught up in shared symbolic dramas or visions and that since the meaning, emotion, and motive for action are contained in the drama, the object of study is not the people but the message.

The utility of using Bormann's theory as a lens for describing, interpreting, and evaluating rhetorical discourse has been demonstrated by a number of scholarly works. Bormann applied his theory to the Eagleton Affair, Kidd to interpersonal communication in popular media, Hensley to religious rhetoric, Cragan to radical Indian rhetoric, and Bantz to the rhetoric of network news.<sup>2</sup> However, the major concepts and structure of the theory have yet to receive empirical verification. In the absence of empirical objectivity, the possibility exists that the reconstructed visions are merely the product of the filtering process of the critic's mind. As with any filter, some elements pass through. Others remain excluded. The result may be highly artistic and creative. Yet, the objectivity of the reconstruction may be dependent on the bias of the filter and not the form of the object. Indeed, the possibility exists

that the personal reconstruction of a communication drama is more a product of the critic's mind than the social reality of the collectivity being studied.

Consequently, in 1974, Donald C. Shields conducted research that demonstrated the feasibility of validating Bormann's dramatistic communication theory.<sup>3</sup> Using William Stephenson's Q-Methodology and N. Van Tubergen's Quanal program for Q-type factor analysis, Shields took one of the theory's concepts (heroic personae) and validated it.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, the basic task of grounding the dramatistic theory remained. In order to provide empirical confirmation that people framed reality and cognitively assimilated events in dramatistic form, rich rhetorical dramas in competition with one another were required. John F. Cragan's reconstruction of American foreign policy dramas (Cold War, Neo-Isolationism, and Power Politics) that appeared in the media between 1946 and 1972 identified the competing dramatic visions needed for validating the theory's major concepts and structure.<sup>5</sup>

To us, the three foreign policy dramas combined with Q-Methodology and Q-type factor analysis provided a mechanism for designing a study to ground Bormann's communication theory, while at the same time creating a rich descriptive frame for analyzing American foreign policy mediated messages.

In light of our concerns as communication theorists and considering our pragmatic rhetorical interests in the political rhetoric of Campaign '76, a useful question for us to ask was, "How do American foreign policy mediated messages play in Peoria?"<sup>6</sup> In addition to providing a literal answer to this question, we hoped our research would shed light on two additional questions: (1) Do people process foreign policy

mediated messages dramatistically? and (2) Is public opinion data gathered in a rhetorical form via a small sample research technique useful in political campaigns?

### Procedure

In doing a field study to discern whether the foreign policy dramatizations that occur in the media also exist in the heads of Peorians, we first built a structured Q-sort data-matrix derived from the foreign policy discussions in the media from January to July, 1976 with the structure of the dramas coming from Cragan's analysis of American foreign policy rhetoric from 1946-1972.<sup>7</sup>

The top of the structured matrix (columns) contains three archetypal foreign policy dramas: Cold War, Neo-Isolationism, and Power Politics. Cragan argued in his initial research that the Cold War drama is a vision that portrays the international scene as a struggle between the free world and communism. In this drama, America's role is to defend the free world from communist aggression. The Neo-Isolationism drama depicts a world in which the United States cannot be the policeman of all conflicts. America's role in this vision is to provide the world with an example through the great experience of democracy, but America should not impose our system on other people. Reason must replace force or we will perish. The Power Politics drama describes a world in which a balance of power among the major nations must be stabilized and managed. America's role in this vision is to provide world stability through the diplomatic successes of its statesmen, who use a combination of military power and negotiation to maintain world order.<sup>8</sup>

The side of the structured matrix (rows) includes elements of the

dramatic structure, dramatic situations, and issue scenarios. We selected the categories for the side of the matrix through the use of an intuitive strategy that led us to examine more than 150 foreign policy articles cited in the Reader's Guide for the period January to July, 1976. The items, selected from content appearing in the media, provided representative dramatizations of here-and-now foreign policy phenomena proportionately across the three dramas.<sup>9</sup> Thus, we built twenty Q-cards for each drama producing a sixty-item structured Q-deck.<sup>10</sup> The foreign policy matrix appears as Table I.

[Insert Table I Here]

Late in July, 1976, we conducted a pilot study involving thirty Illinois State University students. The students sorted the dramatizations on a forced choice continuum from most reflective to least reflective of their view of U.S. involvement in foreign affairs. Our sixty-item forced distribution was 2-3-6-11-16-11-6-3-2 for a nine-category sort.<sup>11</sup> The administration of the pilot study indicated that the sixty items could be sorted and recorded in under sixty minutes and that two researchers were needed to conveniently administer the Q-sort to groups of ten to fifteen respondents.

The structured Q-deck provided the observations about American foreign policy when considered from the perspective of Q-type factor analysis. Two different sets of thirty Peorians constituted the variables in the study.<sup>12</sup> Peorians were selected to participate in the study by the Peoria Chamber of Commerce. The subjects in each group represented the key demographic variables of urbanized Peoria; i.e., sex, education, occupation, and income. The data was gathered in Peoria on August 11 and

12, 1976.

The use of the two groups of thirty Peorians provided a simple design consideration to enable a determination of the construct validity of the Q-analysis factor types by comparing the factor solutions and the derived Q-arrays from the sorting behavior of the two groups. Data was factor analyzed by means of Tubergen's Quanal Program for Q-analysis, providing the Principal Components Solution with Varimax rotation to simple structure and a Weighted Rotational Analytical Procedure that ranked dramatizations for each factor by means of descending z-scores.

#### How the Mediated Messages Played

Factor analysis of our data provided a composite picture describing how foreign policy mediated messages played in Peoria and graphically illustrated the interplay between the three foreign policy dramas. In general, the computer analysis revealed that the dominant drama in the minds of Peorians is Power Politics. Peorians clustered about this drama as the major factor-type. The second largest factor-type presented the Cold War drama, but those loading on this factor type were polarized. As many respondents rejected the Cold War drama as accepted it. Neo-Isolationism played to some extent, but the factor-type that resembled it was very small and somewhat diffused.

Specifically, the factor analyses of the two sets of Peorians produced Principal Components solutions accounting for 52.4 percent and 51.0 percent of the total variance in sorting behavior. Both solutions included six factors and the three major factors in each solution accounted for 76.6 percent and 74.3 percent respectively of the variance within each six factor solution.

The factor type accounting for more than 30 percent of the variance in Peorian's sorting behavior in both factor solutions was Power Politics. The view of foreign policy mediated messages reflective of persons who loaded highest on the Power Politics type is reported in Table II. Table II contains the fifteen cards most reflective of the view of foreign affairs of the people loading highest on this factor and the fifteen cards least reflective of the view of foreign affairs of the people loading highest on this factor.

[Insert Table II Here]

Clearly, the sorting behavior represented by the data in Table II indicates that this factor-type is accurately labeled Power Politics. The top two messages in the typal array for this factor depict the dramatic scene and dramatic hero of Power Politics. Those messages read respectively: Today's international scene is one in which the major powers have reached military parity. What we must do is manage and stabilize our relationship with each other and maintain the balance of power. In a nuclear age we cannot escape the responsibility to build a safe future through wise diplomacy; and America's major role in foreign affairs is to provide world stability through the diplomatic successes of its statesmen who use a combination of military power and negotiation to maintain world order.

Henry Kissinger is the player enacting the heroic role within today's Power Politics drama. It therefore follows that he and his policies should receive at least token support by Peorians participating in the Power Politics drama. As can be seen from Table II, Henry Kissinger is applauded politely (ranked twelfth) as his policies receive a standing

ovation. Detente is ranked third, Middle East is ranked fourth, and Arms Control is ranked fifth.

The villain of the Power Politics drama is basically the uninformed emotional citizenry that either crusades to make the world safe for democracy or retreats into isolationism. So, it is not surprising that Peorians participating in this drama would reject with equal vigor elements of the Cold War drama and the Neo-Isolationist drama. The data in Table II supports this kind of behavior. For example, Peorians loading highest on the Power Politics factor rejected an American hero who is the defender of the free peoples of the world and at the same time rejected the Neo-Isolationist position on dismantling the CIA. A typical Cold War situation card that the Power Politics type rejected is the one pertaining to Panama. It reads: The Panama Canal Zone is not a colonial possession. It is sovereign U.S. Territory, every bit the same as Alaska and all the States that were carved from the Louisiana Purchase. The U.S. has no obligation to relinquish the Canal Zone to Panama.

The data in Table II indicates that Peorians loading highest on this Power Politics factor-type did not strongly reject any Power Politics mediated messages. However, they did strongly accept two Neo-Isolationist messages and one Cold War message. It is not surprising that Power-Politics Peorians would deviate from their vision with respect to the sale of grain to Russia. Peorians do not want agricultural products used as strategic weapons; they want to sell their products to the highest bidder. Also, Peorians representing this factor-type can accommodate the Neo-Isolationist hero which is an American that provides a model democracy for the world to emulate if they so desire. Finally, the Peorians in this

factor-type accept the Cold War interpretation of the lesson of Vietnam, which is that we rightfully tried to stop the spread of communism, but acted indecisively.

A second factor-type accounting for an average of nearly 30 percent of the variance in Peorian's sorting behavior across the two samples was Cold War. The view of foreign policy mediated messages reflective of persons who loaded highest on the Cold War type is reported in Table III. Table III displays the fifteen messages most reflective of the view of foreign affairs of the people loading highest on this factor and the fifteen messages least reflective of the view of foreign affairs of the people loading highest on this factor.

[Insert Table III Here]

The sorting behavior represented by the data in Table III illustrates that this factor type is accurately labeled Cold War. Three of the four top-ranked messages in this typal array depict the dramatic villain, dramatic scene, and dramatic hero of the Cold War drama. These messages read respectively: The major obstacle to world peace is still the Communist ideology which is bent on world domination; and Today's international scene is still a Cold War. It is a struggle between the free world and Communist domination. A struggle for the minds and hearts of the peoples of the world. A struggle that we must not lose; and America's major role in foreign affairs is to defend ourselves and the free peoples of the world from Communist aggression.

Peorians loading on this factor strongly defend the CIA. The media message the Cold-War Peorians ranked second states: Open attacks on the CIA seriously harm America's capability for conducting a covert

fight against the spread of Communist power. The destruction of the CIA demoralizes the anti-communist forces, threatens the freedom and independence of other countries, and endangers freedom here at home.

Since the dramatic structure of the Cold War drama depicts the international scene as a bi-polar world with the U.S. as an active defender against Communist expansion, it is not surprising that Cold-War Peorians reject the Neo-Isolationist drama and view isolationist mediated messages antagonistically. For example, Peorians loading highest on the Cold War factor rejected the message calling for dismantling the CIA, and rejected the view that America should sign a new Panamanian Canal Zone treaty bringing our troops home, thereby staying out of the affairs of Panama. Indeed, the Peorians loading highest on the Cold War type felt so strongly about Panama that they also rejected the Power Politics message that the U.S. should negotiate a new treaty in the best interests of both parties. The fact that the Peorians strongly accepted the Cold War mediated message on Panama, and strongly rejected the Neo-Isolationist and Power Politics mediated messages speaks to the strength of the Panama issue and the intensity of the Cold War position for the respondents loading highest on this factor type. Another situation message stemming from the Neo-Isolationist drama that the Cold War type rejected was one pertaining to Angola. It reads: The U.S. should stop fighting on the side of oppression in places like Angola, and instead provide a model of democracy and decency. The U.S. should dramatize our commitment to African Anti-Colonialism by avoiding both overt and covert interventions into civil wars like Angola. Peorians participating in the Cold War drama want the U.S. to maintain a world-wide commitment.

The data in Table III indicates that Peorians loading highest on

the Cold War factor type did not view the Power Politics mediated messages antagonistically. Negotiation is often viewed as a holding action, and sometimes the Cold Warriors interpret the military moves of the Power Politician as supporting their cause. For example, their reaction to the NATO troops, and Arms Control issues as well as the lesson of Vietnam reflect adherence to the "stick" Power Politics position. However, the Cold-War Peorians do deviate from the expected on the issue of grain, in a manner similar to the Power-Politics Peorians factor type reported above. Once again they accept rather strongly the Neo-Isolationist message on grain. Foreign markets for grain appear more important than grain as a negotiating tool or strategic weapon.

It is important to note that the Cold War factor-type is a reflected factor. Reflected means that it was extracted with a nearly equal number of persons correlating highly positively and highly negatively with the essence of the factor. In the description above, the positive depiction is reported. But it must be remembered that other Peorians who loaded highest on the factor rejected it and what it represented. Thus, the Cold War drama is a polarizing drama in Peoria, and Cold War mediated messages, while creating intense feeling, may create as much repulsion as they do acceptance in Peoria.

A third factor type accounting for an average of about 15 percent of the variance in Peorians' sorting behavior across the two samples was Neo-Isolationism. The view of foreign policy mediated messages reflective of persons who loaded highest on the Neo-Isolationism type is reported in Table IV. Table IV contains the fifteen messages most reflective of the view of foreign affairs of the people loading highest on this factor and the fifteen messages least reflective of the view of foreign affairs

of the people loading highest on this factor.

[Insert Table IV Here]

The sorting behavior represented by the data in Table IV indicates that this factor type is less clearly labeled Neo-Isolationism, in that the sorting behavior is not entirely attributable to a classical isolationist position. What we mean by this is that some Power Politics and Cold War mediated messages are accepted by what is otherwise a Neo-Isolationism type. Nevertheless, the Peorians loading highest on this factor type do accept the dramatic scene and dramatic hero of Neo-Isolationism and reject the dramatic heroes of both the Cold War and Power Politics dramas.

A fourth factor type accounting for an average of only 10 percent of the variance in Peorian's sorting behavior across the two samples was small but worth reporting.

[Insert Table V Here]

It is worth reporting because it does not fit the typology underlying the foreign policy dramatistic matrix. There are two possible interpretations for the sorting behavior of people loading highest on this factor. Either our research instrument did not test these people or the dramatistic communication theory as represented by these three foreign policy dramas cannot explain their behavior. The instrument used in this study demands a high level of literacy and an extended period of concentration (approximately 45 minutes) that some subjects may not have been capable of with respect to foreign policy mediated messages. On the other hand, the Peorians in this factor may be sorting the messages on foreign

policy from a dramatic vision not encompassed by our typology. Whatever the case, Table V presents the data for the factor type. Two examples illustrate the difficulty in interpreting this factor. For one, it is difficult for us to understand how the three mediated messages on the CIA could all be reflective of one viewpoint, especially since we had pre-tested them for their discreteness. Also, the acceptance and rejection of various mediated messages appears almost random across the three foreign policy dramas.

The fifth and sixth factors in both factor solutions do not deserve an extended report. They did not account for much variance and they are merely variations of the previously reported factors of Power Politics and Cold War. They differ from the reported factors only in the intensity and kind of foreign policy messages they reject.

#### Theoretical Implications

Our theoretical question guiding this research was: Do people process foreign policy mediated messages dramatically? The data provides strong support for an affirmative answer. The factor solutions for both samples clearly resemble the three dramas underlying the structured Q-deck data-matrix as the above explanation of Tables II and III indicated. Furthermore, in terms of statistical verification it is important to point out that the Tubergen Quanal program provides three tests for the discreteness of the factor solutions. One is the use of orthogonal rotation itself which means that the extracted factors are independent since the vectors in factor space are rotated at 90 degree angles. Second, the program also computes Pearson Correlation Coefficients between the factors within a solution. In our first sample of Peorians the

correlation between the Power Politics factor and the Cold War factor was .089 and in the second sample, .048. Finally, the program searches for consensus items, i.e., items that are viewed similarly across the factor solution. There were no consensus messages in the first sample, and only two in the second.

We took two samples of thirty Peorians primarily to assess the invariance of the derived factors. The Principal Components Solution extracted six factors in both samples, and both solutions accounted for nearly equal percentages of variance. Also, the major factor in both studies was Power Politics, the second factor was Cold War, and the third factor was Neo-Isolationism. We computed Spearman rho Coefficients on the rank-order z-scores in the typal arrays of the major factors and found positive correlations hovering around .65 between the corresponding factors in both solutions. These are high correlations given the fact that the computation is based on the rank-order variation of the sixty messages. When one looks at the messages in terms of what drama they represent there is an even better fit between the two solutions. For example, the Power Politics factor in both samples can be compared by a simple table that illustrates message placement on the basis of dividing in half the descending array of z-scores. The top half includes accepted messages; the bottom half rejected. See Table VI.

TABLE VI  
COMPARISON OF POWER POLITICS FACTOR

| Sample A<br>Factor I |        |        | Sample B<br>Factor I |        |        |      |      |
|----------------------|--------|--------|----------------------|--------|--------|------|------|
|                      | Accept | Reject |                      | Accept | Reject |      |      |
| P.P.                 | 16     | 4      | (20)                 | P.P.   | 15     | 5    | (20) |
| C.W.                 | 3      | 17     | (20)                 | C.W.   | 4      | 16   | (20) |
| N.I.                 | 11     | 9      | (20)                 | N.I.   | 11     | 9    | (20) |
|                      | (30)   | (30)   | N=60                 |        | (30)   | (30) | N=60 |

As Table VI indicates, both factor solutions reflect similar message distribution. In both solutions the vast majority of the twenty Power Politics cards are accepted, while the vast majority of Cold War messages are rejected.

However, Tables IV and V display data that may indicate that our three-part typology cannot account for all major foreign policy dramas. Our Neo-Isolationism factor is not as coherent as one might expect and our fourth factor is simply not comprehensible when interpreted via our typology.<sup>13</sup> It may be that more than three dramas could be included in our typology in order to explain the remaining variance in sorting behavior.

In validating our foreign policy typology, we have necessarily provided strong evidence that people process messages dramatistically. There is a close empirical fit between the major factors in both samples and the typology. The factors representing the three foreign policy dramas account for approximately 75 percent of the variance in sorting

behavior within each six factor solution. Closer examination of the data provides additional evidence that people process information dramatically. In the Power Politics and Cold War factors in both solutions, the mediated messages representing the dramatic structure of the dramas took precedence over the situation and issue messages. Finally, this research appears to provide empirical confirmation that people frame reality and cognitively assimilate events in dramatic form.

#### Rhetorical Applications

The combination of Bormann's dramatic communication theory, Stephenson's Q-sort technique, and Tubergen's Qanal program for Q-type factor analysis has several applications to speech making. Through this approach rhetorical messages can be directly tested for their persuasiveness. Other widely used approaches such as semantic differential scales, Likert scales, or single response public polling techniques gather data about targeted audiences, attitudes, and beliefs without testing the primary relationship between the message and the audience. Thus, the data must be converted to rhetorical messages and the messages themselves remain untested. The possibility exists that the speech writer's intuitive analysis of such data will produce messages that are not related to the symbolic reality of the targeted audience. Currently the most popular way for correcting the disparity between the speech writer's reality and the audience's reality is a trial-and-error method such as the revising of campaign speeches during the primaries. However, this approach risks the integrity of the speaker for the rhetor can be easily accused of inconsistency.<sup>14</sup>

Although any communication theory can be used for building

structured Q-decks of rhetorical messages, this paper concerns itself with the benefits of using Bormann's dramatistic communication theory. There are two direct applications of this approach. First, rhetorical messages can be tested to determine how well they play, and second, a factor analysis produces a composite picture resembling an effective speech since the thematic ingredients are rank-ordered and compared across dramas.

Our structured Q-deck of three foreign policy dramas essentially provided three different dramatic interpretations of twenty pieces of phenomena on foreign policy. Using the raw data derived from respondents' sorting behavior, a speech writer can compare different rhetorical treatments of the same phenomena. The data gathered in Peoria provides an example of how such an analysis might proceed. Table VII displays six of the twenty items from our 3 X 20 matrix.

[Insert Table VII Here]

An analysis of the table quickly reveals a number of ideas that would be valuable for a speech writer who is preparing a candidate's speech on foreign policy for delivery before a Peorian audience. For example, the speech writer would not want to depict the CIA as an immoral agency that should have its covert powers stripped away (Neo-Isolationism, +3, -12), but should take the position that a covert response stands between a do-nothing policy and nuclear confrontation and thus is a necessary part of our diplomacy (Power Politics, +7, -1). However, the speech creator could identify with the Neo-Isolationism hero of the U.S. as a moral model of democracy (+10, -1) at an idealistic level and still argue the practical Power Politician heroic role of providing world stability

through the diplomatic success of its statesmen (+15, -2). A similar analysis could proceed with regard to dramatic situations and dramatic issues. The speech writer would avoid the Neo-Isolationist dramatization of Panama (+1, -12), while strongly emphasizing the Power Politics depiction of the Middle East (+9, -1). The speech designer would not describe American grain as a strategic weapon (Power Politics, +1, -11), but would accentuate our negotiated posture with respect to arms control (Power Politics, +10, -1). Finally, on these six items, the speech writer would avoid the Cold War dramatic interpretation of American foreign policy because of the polarizing reactions that are in evidence.

Although the raw data analysis of the Q-sort responses provides a speech writer with a means for avoiding mistakes on specific themes, it doesn't enable an assessment of how the specific themes are arranged within a drama or the overall configuration of competing dramas. The combination of Stephenson's Q-technique with Tubergen's Quanal program for factor analysis provides the means to such an assessment.

We felt that the best way to demonstrate the second application of this approach to speech making was to write a speech that is essentially created from the computer printouts that the Weighted Rotational Analytical Procedure of the Quanal program provides. The WRAP phase of this program arrayed the sixty messages on the basis of z-scores from most accepted to most rejected for each of the factors. In addition it used z-score differences to compare individual messages across the factors for their similarities and differences.

Since we were trying to build a foreign policy speech that would please the most and offend the least, we took the messages appearing in the dominant vision receiving the highest z-scores and combined them with

the messages scoring high in the other factors of Cold War and Neo-Isolationism, but not strongly rejected by the Power Politics drama.

The computer-derived speech contained in Table VIII is presented to show the utility of building the rhetorical messages into the audience analysis instrument. In this case we simply "glued together" the successful messages as indicated by the Q-type factor analysis and WRAP phase of the Qanal program. Since the elements of this speech have already been pre-tested for their acceptance by the targeted audience (Peorians), via the construct validated factor analysis, it is reasonable to assume that the derived speech would also be successful if presented to that audience.

[Insert Table VIII Here]

#### Conclusions

The use of a message-centered dramatic communication theory in conjunction with Q-sort technique and factor analysis allowed us to build and test a message-centered foreign policy inventory that contained three dramatic interpretations of U.S. involvement in foreign affairs: Cold War, Power Politics, and Neo-Isolationism. The inventory contained mediated messages for each of twenty foreign policy items across the three dramas, producing a sixty message structured Q-matrix. The mediated messages came from an analysis of 150 articles on U.S. foreign affairs listed in the Reader's Guide for the period January to July, 1976. The Q-deck was administered to two sets of thirty Peorians and the data obtained was construct validated via Q-type factor analysis to determine what foreign policy mediated messages played in Peoria.

The Power Politics drama was the most accepted rhetorical vision

in Peoria. Cold War was a close second, but it appeared to polarize Peorians. Neo-Isolationism was a distant third. The most accepted foreign policy mediated messages might be said to be somewhere between a hard Power Politics and soft Cold War position.

Theoretically, this research provides empirical verification not only for the typology of foreign policy dramas, but for Bormann's dramatistic communication theory. It appears that the utility of Bormann's theory of rhetorical vision goes beyond its use as a descriptive schemata for critiquing rhetorical communication. It may provide us with a why explanation of communication phenomena that is predictive. This research grounds the dramatistic concepts. Subsequent research might work toward prediction.

Pragmatically, the design used in this study indicates that rhetorical messages may be tested for their persuasiveness, producing a direct relationship between message production and audience analysis, without risking the credibility of a speaker.

Also, the study demonstrates the utility of using a Q-type factor analysis of dramatic themes as a means for writing pre-tested dramatistic speeches.

TABLE I

STRUCTURED Q-MATRIX: FOREIGN POLICY MESSAGES;  
INVOLVEMENT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ARCHETYPAL DRAMAS (COLUMNS) AND ELEMENTS (ROWS)

|                                           |                    | Cold War | Neo-Isolationism | Power Politics |
|-------------------------------------------|--------------------|----------|------------------|----------------|
| D<br>r<br>a<br>m<br>a<br>t<br>i<br>c      | Plotline           |          |                  |                |
|                                           | Dramatic Scene     | 1a       | 1b               | 1c             |
|                                           | Hero Persona       | 2a       | 2b               | 2c             |
|                                           | Villain Persona    | 3a       | 3b               | 3c             |
| S<br>t<br>r<br>u<br>c<br>t<br>u<br>r<br>e | Main Actors        |          |                  |                |
|                                           | U.S. Self-Image    | 4a       | 4b               | 4c             |
|                                           | Russia             | 5a       | 5b               | 5c             |
| S<br>i<br>t<br>u<br>a<br>t<br>i<br>o<br>n | Supporting Players |          |                  |                |
|                                           | Kissinger          | 6a       | 6b               | 6c             |
|                                           | CIA                | 7a       | 7b               | 7c             |
| I<br>s<br>s<br>u<br>e<br>s                | Africa             | 8a       | 8b               | 8c             |
|                                           | Angola             | 9a       | 9b               | 9c             |
|                                           | China              | 10a      | 10b              | 10c            |
|                                           | Latin America      | 11a      | 11b              | 11c            |
|                                           | Mid-East           | 12a      | 12b              | 12c            |
|                                           | Panama             | 13a      | 13b              | 13c            |
|                                           | Vietnam Lesson     | 14a      | 14b              | 14c            |
|                                           | Arms Control       | 15a      | 15b              | 15c            |
|                                           | Detente            | 16a      | 16b              | 16c            |
|                                           | Grain              | 17a      | 17b              | 17c            |
|                                           | Intervention       | 18a      | 18b              | 18c            |
|                                           | NATO Troops        | 19a      | 19b              | 19c            |
|                                           | Terrorists         | 20a      | 20b              | 20c            |

TABLE II

FACTOR TYPE 1  
POWER POLITICS DRAMA  
ACCEPTED MESSAGES (RANKED 1-15) REJECTED MESSAGES (RANKED 46-60)

|                                                | Cold War           | Neo-Isolationism | Power Politics |
|------------------------------------------------|--------------------|------------------|----------------|
| D<br>r<br>a<br>m<br>a<br>t<br>i<br>c           | Plotline           |                  |                |
|                                                | Dramatic Scene     |                  | 1              |
|                                                | Hero Persona       | 55               | 7              |
| S<br>t<br>r<br>u<br>c<br>t<br>u<br>r<br>e      | Villain Persona    |                  | 10             |
|                                                | Main Actors        |                  |                |
|                                                | U.S. Self-Image    | 51               | 46             |
| S<br>i<br>t<br>u<br>a<br>t<br>i<br>o<br>n<br>s | Russia             |                  | 14             |
|                                                | Supporting Players |                  |                |
|                                                | Kissinger          | 59               | 54             |
| I<br>s<br>s<br>u<br>e<br>s                     | CIA                |                  | 48             |
|                                                | Africa             |                  | 52             |
|                                                | Angola             |                  |                |
|                                                | China              |                  | 56             |
|                                                | Latin America      |                  | 9              |
|                                                | Mid-East           | 47               | 4              |
|                                                | Panama             |                  | 8              |
|                                                | Vietnam Lesson     |                  | 15             |
|                                                | Arms Control       |                  | 5              |
|                                                | Detente            |                  | 3              |
|                                                | Grain              | 58               | 11             |
|                                                | Intervention       | 53               | 6              |
|                                                | NATO Troops        |                  |                |
|                                                | Terrorists         | 49               |                |

TABLE III

FACTOR TYPE 2  
COLD WAR DRAMA

ACCEPTED MESSAGES (RANKED 1-15) REJECTED MESSAGES (RANKED 46-60)

|                                                | Cold War           | Neo-Isolationism | Power Politics |
|------------------------------------------------|--------------------|------------------|----------------|
| D<br>r<br>a<br>m<br>a<br>t<br>i<br>c           | Plotline           |                  |                |
|                                                | Dramatic Scene     | 3                |                |
|                                                | Hero Persona       | 4                |                |
| S<br>t<br>r<br>u<br>c<br>t<br>u<br>r<br>e      | Villain Persona    | 1                |                |
|                                                | Main Actors        |                  |                |
|                                                | U.S. Self-Image    |                  | 48             |
| S<br>i<br>t<br>u<br>a<br>t<br>i<br>o<br>n<br>s | Russia             | 10               | 55             |
|                                                | Supporting Players |                  |                |
|                                                | Kissinger          |                  |                |
| I<br>s<br>s<br>u<br>e<br>s                     | CIA                |                  |                |
|                                                | Africa             |                  | 49             |
|                                                | Angola             | 11               | 57             |
|                                                | China              |                  | 52             |
|                                                | Latin America      | 12               |                |
|                                                | Mid-East           |                  | 51             |
|                                                | Panama             | 5                | 59 50          |
|                                                | Vietnam Lesson     | 8                | 54 13          |
|                                                | Arms Control       | 15               | 53 9           |
|                                                | Detente            |                  |                |
|                                                | Grain              |                  | 7 58           |
|                                                | Intervention       |                  | 46             |
|                                                | NATO Troops        | 47               | 56 14          |
|                                                | Terrorists         | 6                |                |

TABLE IV

FACTOR TYPE 3  
 NEO-ISOLATIONISM DRAMA  
 ACCEPTED MESSAGES (RANKED 1-15) REJECTED MESSAGES (RANKED 46-60)

|                                                | Cold War           | Neo-Isolationism | Power Politics |
|------------------------------------------------|--------------------|------------------|----------------|
| D<br>r<br>a<br>m<br>a<br>t<br>i<br>c           | Plotline           |                  |                |
|                                                | Dramatic Scene     | 1                |                |
|                                                | Hero Persona       | 46               | 59             |
| S<br>t<br>r<br>u<br>c<br>t<br>u<br>r<br>e      | Villain Persona    |                  |                |
|                                                | Main Actors        |                  |                |
|                                                | U.S. Self-Image    | 52               | 50             |
| S<br>i<br>t<br>u<br>a<br>t<br>i<br>o<br>n<br>s | Russia             |                  | 12             |
|                                                | Supporting Players |                  |                |
|                                                | Kissinger          | 51               | 13             |
| I<br>s<br>s<br>u<br>e<br>s                     | CIA                |                  |                |
|                                                | Africa             | 14               |                |
|                                                | Angola             | 55               |                |
|                                                | China              | 6                |                |
|                                                | Latin America      | 58               |                |
|                                                | Mid-East           | 7                | 4              |
|                                                | Panama             | 15               |                |
|                                                | Vietnam Lesson     | 48               | 8              |
|                                                | Arms Control       | 56               | 5              |
|                                                | Detente            | 57               | 2              |
|                                                | Grain              | 54               | 60             |
|                                                | Intervention       |                  | 10             |
|                                                | NATO Troops        | 49               |                |
|                                                | Terrorists         | 9                | 47             |

TABLE V

FACTOR TYPE 4

UNKNOWN DRAMA

ACCEPTED MESSAGES (RANKED 1-15) REJECTED MESSAGES (RANKED 46-60)

|                                                | Cold War           | Neo-Isolationism | Power Politics |
|------------------------------------------------|--------------------|------------------|----------------|
| D<br>r<br>a<br>m<br>a<br>t<br>i<br>c           | Plotline           |                  |                |
|                                                | Dramatic Scene     | 1                |                |
|                                                | Hero Persona       |                  | 2              |
| S<br>t<br>r<br>u<br>c<br>t<br>u<br>r<br>e      | Villain Persona    | 53               | 4              |
|                                                | Main Actors        |                  |                |
|                                                | U.S. Self-Image    |                  | 49             |
| S<br>i<br>t<br>u<br>a<br>t<br>i<br>o<br>n<br>s | Russia             | 9                |                |
|                                                | Supporting Players |                  |                |
|                                                | Kissinger          | 57               | 58 48          |
| I<br>s<br>s<br>u<br>e<br>s                     | CIA                | 6                | 11 8           |
|                                                | Africa             |                  | 14 13          |
|                                                | Angola             |                  |                |
|                                                | China              |                  | 10             |
|                                                | Latin America      |                  | 3 59           |
|                                                | Mid-East           |                  |                |
|                                                | Panama             |                  | 47             |
|                                                | Vietnam Lesson     | 5                |                |
|                                                | Arms Control       | 54               | 46             |
|                                                | Detente            | 55               | 51             |
|                                                | Grain              | 56               |                |
|                                                | Intervention       | 60               | 50 15          |
|                                                | NATO Troops        | 52               |                |
|                                                | Terrorists         |                  | 7 12           |

TABLE VII

FREQUENCY OF MESSAGE PLACEMENT:  
RAW DATA TEST FOR SALIENCY\* N = 60 RESPONDENTS

|                    | Cold War | Neo-Isolationism | Power Politics |
|--------------------|----------|------------------|----------------|
| Dramatic Structure |          |                  |                |
| Hero Persona       | + 8, - 6 | +10, - 1         | +15, - 2       |
| CIA                | +10, - 7 | + 3, -12         | + 7, - 1       |
| Dramatic Situation |          |                  |                |
| Mid-East           | + 6, - 6 | + 3, - 4         | + 9, - 1       |
| Panama             | + 6, - 6 | + 1, -12         | + 4, - 7       |
| Dramatic Issue     |          |                  |                |
| Arms Control       | + 5, - 8 | + 2, - 7         | +10, - 1       |
| Grain              | + 4, -10 | + 9, - 2         | + 1, -11       |

\*Saliency determined by extreme ranking in top  
two cells (N = 5) or bottom two cells (N = 5)  
of nine-celled distribution of 60 messages.

- numbers for times rejected

+ numbers for times accepted

## TABLE VIII

## COMPUTER-DERIVED FOREIGN POLICY SPEECH

I'd like to take this opportunity here in Peoria to set forth clearly and specifically my position on foreign policy. In order to do that I'd first like to explain how I see the world today and indicate to you what I believe America's role in world politics should be. First of all let me say that the U.S. is not a failure. For 200 years we have provided the world, through the great experience of democracy, a model-- a model that the world is free to follow, but one that we will not impose. Ideally, we would prefer merely to be this model. Unfortunately, the pragmatic realities of the international scene force us to play other roles.

The international scene today is highly complex. In some ways it is still a struggle between the free world and communism. For despite all claims to the contrary, Russia is still a communist state. But, 1976 is not 1956. Russia has acquired nuclear and conventional military parity with us--and China and the Middle East make all dealings with the Russians more difficult. Therefore, in the day-to-day affairs of world politics, we must strive to manage and stabilize our relationships with other major powers. In a nuclear age we cannot escape the responsibility to build a safe future through wise diplomacy.

Now please do not misunderstand me. A policy of detente with the Soviet Union does not mean that we're "Uncle Sucker." I recognize that it's foolhardy to unilaterally disarm, but I also know that it's easy to talk in a mock and tough way and run the risk of war. Neither response reflects my position. Detente means to me a state of affairs marked by the absence of significant tension that could lead the U.S. and Russia

## TABLE VIII (continued)

into a nuclear confrontation. Detente does not mean that all differences will be resolved, or that Russia will not attempt to expand her influence. It does mean that peaceful co-existence is the only rational alternative.

I don't intend to "flip-flop" on any foreign policy issues. Nor do I intend to speak in glib generalities. I came here to talk specifically about American foreign policy and that's what I mean to do. First of all, the lesson of Vietnam. The lesson of Vietnam is one of indecision. The U.S. was not wrong in the purpose for which we fought. While South Vietnam was not totally a free government, they still enjoyed more liberty than any communist regime in Eastern Europe allows. Our mistake was in not moving decisively when we first militarily intervened to discourage further communist aggression in that country.

Which brings me to the issue of possible future U.S. interventions. I believe that intervention is a diplomatic tool that is needed even if it is only a threat to maintain a balanced international scene. Intervention is not right or wrong. But, it may be used rightly or wrongly.

Of course, we cannot talk about intervention without talking about the CIA. I do not believe that we should dismantle the CIA, for many times it is the CIA's covert capability that stands between a do-nothing policy and nuclear confrontation. I oppose unnecessary secrecy, but I believe in a strong national defense. And unfortunately, in today's world, the CIA is needed.

There has been a lot of talk about Europe in this campaign. Let me again state my position. The NATO alliance and the "trip-wire"

## TABLE VIII (continued)

presence of American troops stationed in Germany are important parts of America's defense. It would be foolish to withdraw American troops from the Continent of Europe without negotiating a similar withdrawal of Russian troops from Eastern Europe.

The Middle East is again in a no-war, no-peace stalemate and is likely to remain so for some time. Step-by-step diplomacy, treating all parties with an even hand, is the only means for maintaining a delicate peace in the Middle East.

The United States must ground its China policy in morality. We should work to improve our relationships with her. The People's Republic of China is a sovereign state, but we must not forget to support our ally, The Republic of China, on Taiwan. I believe both governments can learn to live with the reality of each other.

In Africa, a specific American presence is necessary if we are to prevent further communist inroads and a tarnishing of America's influence on this awakening continent. The communists should know that we are prepared to come to the defense of sovereign nations and the Africans should know that we stand ready to help them negotiate a peace among themselves.

In Latin America, we should avoid "big stick" tactics, but we should not stick our heads in the sand to what's going on down there. With respect to Panama, the U.S. neither owns nor has sovereignty over the Canal Zone. But, Panama granted us rights by a 1903 treaty. We should re-negotiate a new treaty that protects America's vital interests in the Canal Zone.

On terrorists, my position is clear. International terrorism,

## TABLE VIII (continued)

such as bombings and hijackings is deplorable. Yet, the U.S. should not put itself in a position committed to meet such actions whenever and wherever they might occur. I will go to the United Nations and get an international law against terrorism.

I should not leave Peoria without stating my opinion on grain sales. First of all, I think the embargoing of food is immoral given the starving millions in the world. Second, whether we sell or do not sell grain to Russia will not alter her behavior in international affairs. Russia should pay the market price for grain just like anyone else.

As I stated in my opening remarks, the U.S. is not a crippled giant. We have not lost confidence in ourselves. We are a proud democratic nation that must play a major role of leadership in international affairs. I trust you will agree that my foreign policy is based on a realistic and mature view of how to maintain world order and peace.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> "Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision: The Rhetorical Criticism of Social Reality," QJS, 58 (Dec. 1972), 396-407.

<sup>2</sup> Ernest G. Bormann, "The Eagleton Affair: A Fantasy Theme Analysis," QJS, 59 (Apr. 1973), 143-159; Virginia Kidd, "Happily Ever After and Other Relationship Styles: Advice on Interpersonal Relations in Popular Magazines, 1951-1973," QJS, 61 (Feb. 1975), 31-39; Carl Wayne Hensley, "Rhetorical Vision and the Persuasion of a Historical Movement: The Disciples of Christ in Nineteenth Century American Culture," QJS, 61 (Oct. 1975), 250-264; John F. Cragan, "Rhetorical Strategy: A Dramatistic Interpretation and Application," Central States Speech Journal, 26 (Spr. 1975), 4-12; Charles R. Bantz, "Television News: Reality and Research," Western Speech, 39 (Spr. 1975), 123-130.

<sup>3</sup> "The Fire Fighters' Dramatis Personae: A Study of Private Projected, and Public Character From the Perspective of Rhetorical Vision" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1974).

<sup>4</sup> The Study of Behavior: Q-Technique and Its Methodology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953); N. Van Tubergen, "Q-Analysis (Quanal)" (unpublished program manual, University of Iowa,

undated).

5 "The Cold War Rhetorical Vision, 1946-1972" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1972).

6 We selected Peoria as the test site for both poetic and sampling reasons. Since the days of vaudeville, the expression "How does it play in Peoria?" has been taken to mean that if an act played well in Peoria, it would play anywhere, and the Watergate tapes gave this expression political meaning. In market research, this metaphor also has held true since Peoria is a mid-western test market for several national corporations.

7 The use of a structured Q-matrix as a means to validate a theory has been established by Stephenson, The Study of Behavior and by Jake Block in The Q-Sort Method in Personality Assessment and Psychiatric Research (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1961).

8 For a more extended depiction of the attributes of these visions, see Cragan, "The Cold War Rhetorical Vision," Chs. II and III.

9 Items were tested for internal consistency within each vision generally following the procedure outlined by Block in The Q-Sort Method. Basically the procedure consists of using experts in the discipline (in this case, political communication and foreign policy) to sort the 60-item deck into three stacks that correspond to the three dramas. This procedure allowed us to identify several messages that were not discreet across visions. These cards were re-written until they were consistently sorted as part of the applicable drama.

10 The procedure of going to the Reader's Guide and selecting relevant articles for building a Q-sort on foreign policy has been previously used and reported by Stephenson in "Application of the Thompson Schemata to the Current Controversy Over Cuba," Psychological Record, 14 (1964), 275-290. The rationale for using this intuitive strategy for building the left side of the matrix is provided by Lewis R. Goldberg in his "Parameters of Personality Inventory Construction and Utilization: A Comparison of Prediction Strategies and Tactics," Multivariate Behavioral Research Monographs, 72 (1972), 1-59.

11 For a discussion of how to administer a forced-choice structured Q-deck, see William D. Brooks, "Q-Sort Technique," appearing in Philip Emmert and Brooks, Methods of Research in Communication (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1970), 165-181.

12 When doing Q-type factor analysis, items and people are treated the opposite of what they in R-type factor analysis. In Q, people are variables and items are observations. Moreover, Q-observations (messages) must exceed Q-variables (people) by at least a 2:1 ratio. For a detailed discussion of these points, see Raymond B. Cattell, "The Meaning and Strategic Use of Factor Analysis," appearing in Cattell, ed., Handbook of Multivariate Experimental Psychology (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), 237.

13 In the pilot study of college students, we did find a strong Neo-Isolationism drama, so another explanation may be that there is simply not a strong Neo-Isolationism drama playing in the minds of Peorians at this time.

14 In the 1976 Presidential Campaign, the terms "flip-flopping" and "waffling" were used to describe the inconsistencies arising from such experimentation.